“These aircraft will help provide Iraq with air sovereignty, protect its territory, and deter or respond to regional threats.”
That was the first official statement on Iraq’s F-16 deal with the United States, made by Victoria Nuland, spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, in 2011.
Since 2008, Iraq’s new government has expressed an interest in purchasing 96 F-16 fighter jets. Although this ambition persisted, it ultimately resulted in a deal with Washington to acquire only 36 jets. These aircraft were meant to be the cornerstone of future cooperation between Baghdad and Washington, “supporting Iraq’s secure, peaceful, and democratic development,” according to the U.S.
Back in 2008, Iraqi Air Force Brigadier General Ali Al-Aaraji performed a flight manoeuvre in one of the jets at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. It wasn’t just a test ride. For Al-Aaraji, it was the realisation of a dream. “It was my dream to fly an F-16, and it came true.”
The deal stipulated that Iraq would receive the F-16 fighter jets in two batches: the first, consisting of 18 jets, was to arrive in 2014, followed by a second batch to be completed by 2019. However, this plan was not fully realised. The United States delayed the delivery of the jets to Nouri Al-Maliki’s government after ISIS swept through large parts of Iraq. Washington justified the delay by expressing concerns over the possibility of advanced military technology falling into the hands of ISIS fighters, as well as its growing unease with the behaviour of Al-Maliki’s government during his second term. This led to a diplomatic crisis and tension between the Maliki administration and the U.S.
Why is this deal considered one of the most expensive? Simply because it involved the sale of “low-cost” aircraft with strict limitations on combat capabilities, at a price higher than that of the far more advanced F-35 fighter jets. Baghdad purchased each low-cost F-16 from Washington for over 165 million U.S. dollars. At the time, the more advanced F-35 was priced at 154 million U.S. dollars each.
According to Time magazine, the U.S. Department of Defense had stopped purchasing F-16s since the mid-1990s. Back then, it was buying them from manufacturers at an average price of 17 million U.S. dollars per aircraft. The Pentagon ceased procurement of this model as it shifted toward the fifth-generation F-35 program, as well as the F-22 Raptor jets.
Not all the aircraft reached Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force lost two jets and two pilots in crashes during training exercises in the United States, the first in 2015, and the second the following year, bringing the total number of jets down to 34.
Deterioration
In 2020, the problems became even more dramatic when dozens of American contractors withdrew from Balad Air Base following threats made by Iran-aligned Iraqi factions against U.S. presence and coalition forces.
This tension and the withdrawal of U.S. experts from Lockheed Martin (the manufacturer of Iraq’s F-16 jets) led to the deterioration of the fighter jet fleet and its suspension from international coalition air missions against ISIS.
On January 6, 2021, the Iraqi Army celebrated its 100th anniversary. Twenty-three F-16 fighter jets participated in the ceremony, which at that time were still considered the “pride of the Iraqi Air Force” and its most advanced combat assets. The flyover took place in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi.
However, that flyover and the number of jets on display raised questions about the readiness of Iraq’s 9th Squadron. Wasn’t the total number of Iraqi F-16s supposed to be 34? Where were the rest?
According to reports based on testimonies from senior officers in the Iraqi Air Force, the F-16 squadron was in a dire condition, with only seven out of 34 aircraft capable of flying without a significant risk of crashing. To secure the spare parts needed for operations and maintenance, the Iraqi military resorted to a process known as cannibalisation, dismantling some jets and using them as spare parts to keep others in service.
Just one day after the centennial military parade, the aviation website, Scramble of the Dutch Aviation Society, published a report on Iraq’s F-16 squadron. According to the report, at least 10 jets out of the 34 based at Balad Air Base were completely non-operational.
Moreover, over 50% of the 23 jets that participated in the parade were only airworthy; they lacked radar systems and the electronic components required to operate weapons as well as suffering from other deficiencies. “By Western standards, these aircraft would not be allowed to fly at all.”
Operating advanced fighter jets such as the F-16 requires continuous financial and logistical commitments throughout their operational lifespan, which typically ranges between 20 and 30 years. This high cost poses a recurring challenge to the Iraqi military budget.
In 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense awarded a one-year contract worth 400 million U.S. dollars to Sallyport Global to provide operational, training, and security support for Balad Air Base and the Iraqi F-16 program.
Two years earlier, in late June 2016, Iraq secured a 2.7 billion U.S. dollar loan from the United States to finance the purchase of ammunition, and the maintenance of F-16 jets, tanks, and other military equipment used in the fight against ISIS.
At the time, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad stated that Iraq would have eight years and six months to repay the loan, including a one-year grace period, at an interest rate of 6.45 per cent.
Iraq’s F-16 program employs more than 4,000 personnel, making it one of the most expensive defence programmes in the country. Contracts with U.S. companies, such as Sallyport and Lockheed Martin, have continued to cover spare parts, maintenance, and crew training. In one of the later support contracts, the annual cost reached approximately 130 million U.S. dollars to maintain and support the Iraqi F-16 fleet. Since entering service, Iraq’s F-16 fighter jets have struggled to maintain combat readiness. By late 2020, for example, the operational readiness of the 9th Squadron (responsible for operating the F-16s) had dropped to below 20 per cent.
Iraqi officers have acknowledged mismanagement in maintenance programs and a failure to adhere to aviation safety standards, resulting in aircraft breaking down at higher-than-expected rates and several jets being taken out of service.
Other factors
Corruption, negligence, and lack of expertise are additional reasons behind the collapse of the 9th Squadron at Balad Air Base. In August 2020, Iraq Oil Report published a report containing testimonies from Iraqi officers and pilots stationed at the base, as well as statements from officials and employees of Sallyport, the company awarded the contract to maintain the fighter jet program and its infrastructure. They revealed systemic corruption taking place within the base and the squadron.
One example shared by the officers and pilots was the reduction of ground maintenance crews from four technicians per aircraft to just one. This led to a failure to properly secure an F-16 after a sortie, causing it to roll and crash into a maintenance vehicle, inflicting significant damage to the aircraft, specifically to its nose section.
The Iraq Oil Report also exposed the falsification of flight logs in order to exaggerate the number of training sorties, which allowed for the theft and black-market sale of aviation fuel, specifically JP-8, a high-purity kerosene with precise thermal properties.
One of the inherent weaknesses of Iraq’s F-16 program is its complete reliance on the U.S. supply chain for spare parts and logistical support. All procurement and contracts are processed through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and require approval from the U.S. administration.
This means that any political or administrative delays in Washington directly impact the availability of maintenance supplies at Balad Air Base. Iraq has faced, and continues to face, such issues, including the delayed delivery of DB-110 reconnaissance pods, which were contracted in 2012 but have yet to be delivered due to procedural hurdles.
Some spare parts are also subject to export restrictions and can only be shipped if U.S. contractors are physically present to install them. When those contractors withdrew at the end of 2020, Iraqi personnel had no technical access to manufacturers for spare parts or maintenance guidance.
Another issue plaguing the programme is the low number of qualified Iraqi pilots. Iraq has trained only 40 pilots to operate the F-16s, barely more than one pilot per aircraft, which is below the operational standard required for such fleets. The recommended ratio is three pilots per aircraft to ensure rotation and prevent pilot fatigue.
Iraqi technicians specialising in F-16 maintenance are only capable of performing basic tasks, such as flight checks, loading munitions, and providing ground services. However, complex repairs, engine operations, and electronic system servicing must either be handled by mobile U.S. teams or sent back to the United States, leaving Iraq’s air force with limited autonomy over its fleet.
Strict oversight and restrictions on Iraq’s fighter jet program were a significant concern for the United States even before the contract was signed. The deal underwent scrutiny by the U.S. Congress to ensure that the technology would not be transferred to “undesirable” countries. Based on this, conditions were imposed, such as prohibiting the jets from being equipped with long-range missiles (AMRAAM) or smart bombs that could disrupt the regional balance of power. Software modifications were also introduced to limit the jets’ combat capabilities. The Iraqi government at the time, led by Nouri Al-Maliki, had no choice but to accept these terms to finalise the deal.
In addition to all of this, the 9th Squadron cannot carry out any real combat manoeuvres without being linked to the international coalition’s communications systems. This requires continuous maintenance and ongoing training, both of which demand new contracts with the U.S. for spare parts and critical systems needed to keep the fighter squadron operational.
However, all of this continues to face serious challenges, particularly in terms of effective management and the availability of a sustainable annual budget to ensure the squadron remains capable of flying and fighting.